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FAA Inaction Is Costing Loss of Flying Public's Life

Moog Aircraft Internal Battle Against Corruption and Cover-Up

Picture is used to illustrate only

Critics accused the FAA of inaction in the face of a threat to safety.

Well, industry watchdogs and the Transport Workers Union are now suggesting that the FAA could have done something to potentially prevent the incident from occurring, had they taken action sooner.

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FAA inaction could cause more Boeing plane accidents.Action NOW!

Some 500 Boeing planes were compromised due to knowingly installing counterfeit safety critical parts made in China.

Moog Aircraft top management committed a felony.

FAA inaction and massive cover-up

Before and after I made my first Moog internal whistle blowing to Mr. Kevin Walek 08/08/2015, a battle against the corruption and cover-up within Moog Aircraft China Supply Chain was raging.

In April, 2015, two of my supplier development engineers (SDE) alerted me that NHJ was exited by its previous aerospace customer B/E Aerospace due to NHJ massive use of fake material resulting in product failures of B/E.

I immediately reported it to my supervisor Mr. Joe Zou. Mr. Zou brushed it off. Joe was suspected of kick-back arrangement with Moog Chinese suppliers.

In May, 2015, I and my SDEs identified NHJ was using an illicit material tracking system (MID) of its own disconnecting aerospace material traceability. We also identified that NHJ was outsourcing Moog business to unknown and unapproved sub-tiers. 

I asked supplier quality lead Ms. Claire Starzak to investigate and perform corrective actions, but my request was ignored. Then I, myself and SDEs started investigation and we tried to correct the violations (More will be elaborated in future posting).

I asked Mr. XXX, the SDE responsible for NHJ to do a process audit on NHJ in early June, 2015. Mr.XXX used to carry supplier quality management before 2012 in Moog and his previous aerospace employment, so he had lot of experience in supplier quality management.

Mr. XXX  came back with a report 03/06/2015. 

Mr. XXX NHJ Audit Report 03/06/2015

Exh. Moog007 page 4

Mr. XXX wrote in red: "lot tracking using MID number which is NHJ material identification number...NHJ...only MID in tracking."

Mr. XXX Audit Report Dated 03/06/2015

Moog Internal Memo Directing SQE, ME Accepting My Job Assignment in China

Ms. Starzak also refused to go and audit unknown & unapproved sub-tiers NHJ was outsourcing Moog business.

Ms. Starzak defiantly wrote 06/07/2015 : "Neither Charlie or myself will be auditing these sub-tiers."

Ms. Starzak refused to audit illicit sub-tiers of NHJ.

Exh. Moog008 page 2

I wrote to Ms. Starzak; "I don't have a good clue of your thought process..."

Charles Shi emailed Ms. Starzak rebuking her wrong thought process.

Exh. Moog008 page 1

I wrote: "Moog approval of 2nd tier...is to make sure 2nd tiers meeting Moog requirement and I don't think we can't do it."

Exh. Moog008 page 1

Actually prior to Ms. Starzak was a trained Moog SQE, Moog Aircraft Supplier Quality organization already had an established rule on auditing and approving 2nd tiers.

Moog Quality Procedure on Sub-Tier Management 23/05/2013

I complained 24/09/2015 to Subu Bhat(Quality director of Moog Aircraft), Ms. Starzak's direct supervisor, on her misconduct and incompetency. 

I wrote: "The findings highlighted in RED should be easily captured as serious and major...unfortunately, we failed to see Claire did anything in this regards."

Charles Shi emailed 24/09/2015 to Subu Bhat complaining Ms. Starzak misconduct.

Exh. Moog007 page 1

Unfortunately, Moog quality organization did not respond to my complaint and did not do anything to discipline Ms. Starzak.

Only after I made my first Moog internal whistle blowing 08/08/2015 to Mr. Kevin Walek, did Ms. Starzak begin to realize the seriousness of the matter.

Ms. Starzak filed her initial investigation report 20/08/2015 which was the only one she had during the three week investigation ordered by Mr Walek and her boss, Jesse Mangual, VP of quality, Moog Aircraft Group. 

Initial Investigation Report by Ms. Starzak

Exh. Moog119

She wrote: "when raw material is issued to the batch...only the NHJ material number(MID) is recorded."

"Some instances were found where more than one material batch was issued under a single NHJ internal material number, which could lead to issues in the event parts had to be traced."

What a incompetent SQE, Ms. Starzak did not even know that in aerospace, material has to be traced, there is NO event parts had to be traced.

Ms. Starzak's Initial Investigation Report

Exh. Moog119

Ms. Starzak also realized NHJ illicit outsourcing Moog business was not correct. 

She wrote: "NHJ currently do not have a process for subcontracting aerospace parts and they should not be subcontracting anything without Moog's permission and involvement."

Ms. Starzak admitted NHJ should not outsourcing Moog business.

Exh. Moog119

By the time Ms. Starzak wrote her initial report, total of 11 Moog part numbers, thousands of pieces of suspected unapproved parts had already been shipped to Moog, Moog accepted all of them and assembled them into Boeing safety critical flight control systems.

Moog did not go back to old suppliers and Moog did not have new suppliers, Moog only continued to accept the suspected unapproved (SUP) parts by NHJ illicit sub-tiers. 

Ms. Starzak did not complete her three week investigation and did not produce a final report.

It was more unfortunate Ms. Starzak was acting alone or under instruction to re-approve NHJ as Moog approved supplier, letting NHJ, the verified counterfeiter to continue shipping SUPs to US aviation system even they knew NHJ was a counterfeiter.

Ms. Starzak Statement Under Oath

Exh. RX-27

Ms. Starzak stated: NHJ was placed back on Moog's list of approved supplier in October, 2015.

Exh. RX27

The most unfortunate thing is FAA accepted Moog forgery that corrective action was taken. FAA inaction caused these SUPs remain on Boeing planes today posing extreme safety threat to flying public.

Ms. Starzak did another bad thing refusing to investigate NHJ admitted forgery of travelers. This grave violation  was not investigated by Moog and FAA.

It was terrible that entire Moog  Aircraft, later joined by Boeing and FAA, relied on this reckless, erratic, and incompetent Ms. Starzak and her mishandled investigation in creating an unprecedented Boeing plane safety threat posing extreme safety threat to flying public.

Moog Aircraft cheated on the violation of unbaked safety sensitive parts of B777 spoilers which in turn was manipulated by FAA cover-up.

Though Moog HR determined Mr Joe Zou violated Moog Ethics, he was allowed to stay at Moog continuing his collusion with the Chinese counterfeiter.

Moog HR Manager Don Needham determined Mr Zou violated Moog Ethics.

Exh, Moog099 page 1

In the meantime, Joe was plotting to get me out of Moog because of my exposing his criminal activities. 

Moog China HR manager Ms. Estella Ling had a consul session with Mr. Zou, Ms. Ling wrote to Moog Aircraft and testified: "if this issue is solved and he (Joe) continued to work in Moog...he needs to have a separate talk to Charles...he (Charles) might not be the best fit for the supply chain manager. Thus I (Ms Ling) guess if the issue is solved and Joe continues to lead the team, then we can expect Charles might be out of the team."

Ms Estella Ling, Moog China HR manager, emailed on 18/09/2015 testifying Charles might be out of the team.

Exh. Moog099 page 3

Indeed, in the end, Moog was very successful in throwing out a protected and lawful whistle blower who was actually doing good to Moog/Boeing and flying public.

Moog was on the wrong side of history by having the criminal suspect to  stay by blessing Mr. Zou to continue his collusion with the verified Chinese counterfeiting supply.

What a scam!

Last Dinner at Moog Aircraft. Battle Against Corruption Continues

Mr Li Jian, owner of NHJ, 2nd to the left,, Charles Shi, in the middle, Warren Johnson, outgoing president of Moog Aircraft, 2nd to the right, Jesse Mangual, VP of Quality, first to the right.


Press, flying public, please join me in crying out for removal of counterfeit safety parts from Boeing planes!!

For more information, please contact:

Email: [email protected]

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